Does the Philosophy of Mysticism Rest on a Mistake?
The Problem of Pure Consciousness March 29, 1990 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195059809.003.0009 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractImmanuel Kant rejected the possibility of genuine mystical experience—direct experience of the divine in this life—because his epistemology made no room for the cognitive faculties such experience would require. Despite his hostility, many later philosophers of mysticism have adopted Kant's general epistemological framework as the foundation for analyzing all kinds of experience, including mystical ones. This article examines the tension between Kant's denial of mystical experience and the subsequent attraction of his philosophical scheme for theorists of mysticism.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 24 |
| Key finding | Argues that Kant's epistemological framework, which denies the possibility of genuine mystical experience, is an unsuitable foundation for analyzing mystical experiences, despite its widespread adoption by philosophers of mysticism. |
Abstract
Abstract Although Immanuel Kant was unremittingly hostile in his attitude toward the claims of mystics to have experience of the divine already in this life, a great many philosphers of mysticism have subsequently been attracted to the epistemological scheme of the Critical Philosophy, at least in its general outlines. Kant denied the possibility of genuine mystical experience (as opposed to merely mislabeled feelings of illumination) because such experience would require the possession in our present state of cognitive faculties for which no provision was, or seemingly could be, made in his epistemology. Yet numerous philosophers who wittingly or unwittingly have taken their lead from him have assumed that his general approach marks the most natural starting point for the analysis of all sorts of experience, including all those types typically referred to as mystical.