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Does the Philosophy of Mysticism Rest on a Mistake?

Anthony N Perovich

The Problem of Pure Consciousness March 29, 1990 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780195059809.003.0009 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Mysticism
Citations 24
Key points Argues that Kant's epistemological framework, which denies the possibility of genuine mystical experience, is an unsuitable foundation for analyzing mystical experiences, despite its widespread adoption by philosophers of mysticism.

Abstract

Abstract Although Immanuel Kant was unremittingly hostile in his attitude toward the claims of mystics to have experience of the divine already in this life, a great many philosphers of mysticism have subsequently been attracted to the epistemological scheme of the Critical Philosophy, at least in its general outlines. Kant denied the possibility of genuine mystical experience (as opposed to merely mislabeled feelings of illumination) because such experience would require the possession in our present state of cognitive faculties for which no provision was, or seemingly could be, made in his epistemology. Yet numerous philosophers who wittingly or unwittingly have taken their lead from him have assumed that his general approach marks the most natural starting point for the analysis of all sorts of experience, including all those types typically referred to as mystical.

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