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Gestalt psychology and the philosophy of mind

William Epstein, Gary Hatfield

Philosophical Psychology 1994 DOI: 10.1080/09515089408573118 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 34
Key points Argues that Gestalt psychology combined phenomenal realism with programmatic physiological reductionism, treating meanings and values as natural features of perceived objects, and that this position differs from instrumentalism and computational functionalism. The authors propose a metatheoretical lesson: mental phenomena and their physiological counterparts should be described in commensurate terms.

Abstract

The Gestalt psychologists adopted a set of positions on mind‐body issues that seem like an odd mix. They sought to combine a version of naturalism and physiological reductionism with an insistence on the reality of the phenomenal and the attribution of meanings to objects as natural characteristics. After reviewing basic positions in contemporary philosophy of mind, we examine the Gestalt position, characterizing it m terms of phenomenal realism and programmatic reductionism. We then distinguish Gestalt philosophy of mind from instrumentalism and computational functionalism, and examine Gestalt attributions of meaning and value to perceived objects. Finally, we consider a metatheoretical moral from Gestalt theory, which commends the search for commensurate description of mental phenomena and their physiological counterparts.

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