Cognitive Consciousness in Kant’s Theory of Experience
Edvardas Rimkus
Filosofija Sociologija September 17, 2019 DOI: 10.6001/fil-soc.v30i3.4041 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Kant's theory of cognitive consciousness can be read psychologically, not only epistemologically, and that it implicitly contains a social dimension Kant never expressed: a priori concepts and rules of cognition are produced and legitimated intersubjectively in a social community. Proposes that a psychological treatment of transcendental consciousness requires introducing intellectual intuition, which Kant's theory refuses. |
Abstract
The article investigates the Kantian theory of cognitive consciousness not only as epistemological but also as psychological theory of human consciousness. Kant describes experience as a synthesis of sensible matter and conceptual form. Transcendental consciousness, producing basic conceptual instruments of cognition and acting both in the spheres of outer and inner experience, lying on the ground of this process. There is a social aspect in this theory of cognitive consciousness that Kant himself has never expressed directly: a priori concepts and principles/rules of cognition are produced and legitimated not only by separate individuals but also intersubjectively in a social community. Treating transcendental consciousness psychologically as a theory analysing mechanisms that establish individual consciousness, intellectual intuition (which is refused in Kant’s theory) needs to be introduced.