Intentionality, Reduction, and the Life-World in Edmund Husserl: A Systematic Inquiry

Abstract

This study aims to systematically examine the fundamental concepts of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological philosophy. Husserl developed an original method in 20th-century philosophy, thereby reestablishing the structure of consciousness and the subject-object relationship. This reestablishment effort takes shape particularly through his critique of naturalism and psychologism. In this context, the study addresses the central concepts of Husserl's phenomenology—intentionality, phenomenological reduction, epoche, transcendental idealism, and the life-world. These concepts are closely interrelated and constitute different aspects of the phenomenological method. In addition, Husserl's critique of positivism and his thoughts concerning the crisis of European sciences, along with the epistemological and ontological dimensions of the phenomenological method, are examined. Indeed, Husserl's call "to the things themselves," the intentional structure of consciousness, and the concept of the life-world offer original responses to the fundamental problems of modern philosophy. In conclusion, it is emphasized that phenomenology is not merely a method but also a search for a new foundation for science and philosophy. İn this respect, Edmund Husserl's thought not only offers a theoretical framework but also allows for a deeper understanding of the relationship between humans and the world. By revealing the constitutive role of consciousness, it makes visible how meaning is formed and through what structures experience is shaped. Thus, it gives a new direction to philosophical thought.