Meatless minds vs. beast machines: Are simulated subjects impossible?
Krzysztof Dołęga, Axel Cleeremans
Behavioral and Brain Sciences September 17, 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x25103889 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Seth's claim that simulations necessarily lack the causal powers or intrinsic properties of real consciousness risks begging the question against computational functionalism and faces a dilemma over the reducibility of qualia, weakening his case and leaving open the possibility that simulations could in principle realize consciousness. |
Abstract
We challenge Seth's claim that simulations of consciousness necessarily lack the causal powers or intrinsic properties of real consciousness. We argue that Seth's position risks begging the question against computational functionalism and faces a dilemma over the reducibility of qualia. This weakens his case, leaving open the possibility that simulations could, in principle, realize consciousness.