Testing Biopsychism: Commentary on Block’s (2025) “Can Only Meat Machines Be Conscious?”
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Anti-Functionalism clashes with known principles of evolution, whereas the weaker Anti-Computationalism, when properly understood, should motivate feasible but rarely attempted experimental efforts. |
Abstract
There are (at least) two possible readings of Block’s recent suggestion that consciousness may depend on subcomputational biological mechanisms [1]. First, there could be distinct mechanisms that support the same computations, yet only some biological ones give rise to subjective experiences. These mechanisms may differ functionally in ways that cannot be characterized in purely computational terms. Alternatively, there could be distinct mechanisms that make no functional (including computational) difference whatsoever, yet only some biological ones give rise to subjective experiences. I will argue that this second view—Anti-Functionalism—clashes with known principles of evolution. The first, weaker view—Anti-Computationalism—when properly understood, should motivate experimental efforts that are feasible but rarely attempted.