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The Phenomenology of Inference

Jody Azzouni

The Anatomy of Experience December 12, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/9780197790151.003.0010 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that we do not experience deduction and induction as two distinct kinds of inference, but only the experience of one proposition following from another, which undermines the doctrine that necessity is an introspective characteristic of successful inference. Also proposes that awareness focuses on inferred propositions rather than premises, explaining why much reasoning is tacit.

Abstract

Abstract Attending to when we do and do not metacognize during inference, we can recognize two forms of inferential experience: “local-followness,” which labels the experience that a proposition follows from previous propositions, and, second, mechanical rule-following, the experience that we have when we see that one proposition results from the application of a set of rules to other propositions. With this distinction in hand, we can recognize further that we do not experience two kinds of inference: deduction and induction. Instead we simply experience X following from Y, and nothing more in the moment. This undermines the doctrine that necessity is an introspective characteristic of (successful) inference, as opposed to an agent just being unable to imagine alternatives. Also, while we can be aware of the proposition inferred, we are far less so about the propositions from which it is inferred. This is why so much reasoning is tacit.

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