How to Be a Mereological Panpsychist
January 19, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780198982111.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Spinoza's and Cavendish's commitment to explanatory systematicity in metaphysics leads them to panpsychism, and that each offers a distinctive solution to two explanatory problems: identifying a plausible mark of the mental and accounting for mental 'parts'. Their treatments of mental parthood bear on the 'combination problem' often described as the most formidable problem facing panpsychism. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter focuses on how Spinoza’s and Cavendish’s commitment to explanatory systematicity in metaphysics manifests itself in their metaphysics of mind, and, in particular, as a commitment to panpsychism. I identify two explanatory problems that a systematic metaphysics of mind developed along either Cavendishian or Spinozistic lines must tackle, concerning, respectively, (i) identifying a plausible mark of the mental, and (ii) developing a compelling account of mental ‘parts’. I reconstruct Spinoza’s and Cavendish’s models of panpsychism, present their distinctive solutions to the two explanatory problems, and discuss how their treatments of mental parthood bear on the so-called ‘combination problem’, often described as the most formidable problem facing panpsychism