Panpsychism, or the Question “What Is the Subject of Experience?”

Spinoza's claim that all things are animated is often taken as evidence that he believed every entity has a mind, a view called panpsychism. This chapter examines the key passage usually cited for that interpretation and argues instead that Spinoza meant something different: that rational intelligibility extends throughout the universe without exception. The author contends that Spinoza's universal animation does not ascribe minds to every being but rather asserts that everything is understandable through reason, closing any gap in the rational order of nature.

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Abstract

This chapter discusses the issue of Spinoza’s so-called panpsychism, which is the view, often ascribed to him, that all entities are endowed with minds. In particular, the chapter takes a closer look at the scholium following 2p13, which is usually taken as the textual evidence for this reading. In contrast to the panpsychist interpretation, the chapter shows that, by claiming universal animation, Spinoza does not intend to ascribe minds to all and every being. Instead, the chapter suggests reading his claim as maintaining that rationalism holds throughout the universe or, in other words, that intelligibility applies to all beings without any gap.