Panpsychism, or the Question “What Is the Subject of Experience?”
Ursula Renz
Oxford Scholarship Online July 19, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199350162.003.0012 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Spinoza's claim of universal animation should be interpreted as maintaining that rationalism and intelligibility apply to all beings, not as ascribing minds to every entity. |
Abstract
This chapter discusses the issue of Spinoza’s so-called panpsychism, which is the view, often ascribed to him, that all entities are endowed with minds. In particular, the chapter takes a closer look at the scholium following 2p13, which is usually taken as the textual evidence for this reading. In contrast to the panpsychist interpretation, the chapter shows that, by claiming universal animation, Spinoza does not intend to ascribe minds to all and every being. Instead, the chapter suggests reading his claim as maintaining that rationalism holds throughout the universe or, in other words, that intelligibility applies to all beings without any gap.