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Substrates, computations, and abundant consciousness: Commentary on Anil Seth

Luke Roelofs

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x2510349x (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that under a panpsychist background theory, the debate between computational and biological views of consciousness becomes less central, and that we should default to accepting a non-biological system's self-ascriptions of consciousness even if it could not have our consciousness.

Abstract

Abstract Seth opposes computational views of consciousness to views that emphasise biology, because they imply different verdicts about hypothetical AIs that replicate information-processing without being biologically alive. But if we accept a background theory like panpsychism, on which consciousness is abundant in nature, this opposition becomes less central: even if a non-biological system could not have our consciousness, we should still default to accepting any self-ascriptions of consciousness it makes.