Relational equality for extended minds
M. Carter
Synthese September 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-025-05242-w (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the extended mind thesis implies persons have two core interests—an interest in an environment supportive of cognition and an interest in extended mental authenticity—and that relational egalitarians must be spatially conscious of these interests, which yields unique insights in cases involving landlords and tenants, cloud software and tech ecosystems, and forced transfers for dementia care. |
Abstract
This paper deals with the impact of the extended mind thesis on relational egalitarianism: the now-dominant view on (the politically relevant form of) equality within contemporary political philosophy. If proponents of the extended mind thesis are right, I argue, persons have two core interests that arise from their relationships with elements of the external environment: an interest in an environment supportive of cognition and an interest in extended mental authenticity. Acknowledging this requires relational egalitarians to be spatially-conscious, giving these interests due weight wherever they are engaged. This will not always change their conclusions, but there are a range of cases in which this form of relational egalitarianism yields unique insights. In this paper, I examine three: the relationship between landlords and tenants, cloud software and tech ecosystems, and forced transfers for dementia care.