THE DERIVABILITY GAP – A PROBLEM OF INTUITIONS
Revista Română de Filosofie Analitică June 5, 2025 DOI: 10.62229/rrfaxvi-2/4 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that materialists often hold implicit dualist intuitions, and that a "derivability gap" makes a materialist view of consciousness hard to accept. Proposes that our binary on/off thinking, useful for understanding unobservables, also shapes how we conceive consciousness, possibly due to limited direct exposure to its complexity. |
Abstract
This paper addresses our difficulty in grasping how something like consciousness could emerge from the processes of our brain, aiming to explain the intuitions that underlie this struggle. I start with an investigation of materialism, revealing that its supporters often have deep-seated dualist intuitions implicitin some of the language they use. I then question whether we can warrant the claim that conscious experience is fundamentally different from non-conscious phenomena with respect to causal powers and causal roles. I identify the derivability gap as the reason behind our intuitive struggles, explaining how these intuitions make it difficult to accept a materialist view of consciousness. Lastly, I explain why we hold onto these intuitions. Instead of seeking a socio-cultural origin for our dualist intuitions about the mind-body problem, I suggest we examine our intuitive grasp of the physical world, arguing that our tendency to see things in binary on/off forms extends beyond our grasp of consciousness. I propose that we consider whether the same simplifying principle that aids our understanding of unobservables might also influence how we conceive consciousness. I conclude that our lack of direct exposure to its complexity may underlie our binary understanding of life and non-life, which we extend to the contrast between material and non-material.