Revista Română de Filosofie Analitică
May 14, 2026
Rareș Mihnea Iosifescu
Mechanisms of change in dramatherapy are poorly understood, compromising its bona fide therapy status. Given growing attention to how alternative frameworks of cognition might inform mental health practices, I aim to provide an enactivism-congruent and affordance-based account of dramatherapy. A secondary aim is to suggest why disabled or differently abled clients might benefit more from such...
Revista Română de Filosofie Analitică
May 14, 2026
Irina Alexe
Dissociative disorders are generally understood in psychiatry as a disruption or discontinuity in the normal integration of consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception, body representation, motor control or behavior. Still, no definitive theoretical model makes sense of the full spectrum of experiences that currently fall under the large umbrella of “dissociative”. This lack of a...
Revista Română de Filosofie Analitică
May 14, 2026
Victor-Ionuţ Rusu
I will argue that if subjective experience is a prerequisite for mindreading, then Large Language Models and philosophical zombies either have different ways of mindreading or they cannot partake in understanding others. I will explore how this impacts recent debates on Large Language Models (LLMs). At first I will explore the consequences following from the assumption that phenomenal...
Revista Română de Filosofie Analitică
May 10, 2026
Radu Nedescu
Drawing on both Anglo-Saxon and continental phenomenology, this text analyzes the impact of affordances and sensorial content on sub-doxastic processes by investigating the experience of eating a kinder bueno in order to distract oneself from one’s discontent(s). More specifically, I provide an analysis of how the perceived kinder bueno’s impoverished content—nonconceptual and sensory—are used...
Revista Română de Filosofie Analitică
June 5, 2025
Mihai Alexandru Bîclea
Scientists have attempted to find consciousness and, more specifically, qualia in the physical world ever since philosophers such as Thomas Nagel (1974) or Frank Jackson (1986) have commented upon the elusive experiential properties of such mental states that are characterized by a specific “what’s it like”. One of the proposals to minimize the metaphysical and epistemological tension that...
Revista Română de Filosofie Analitică
June 5, 2025
Sonia Micu
This paper addresses our difficulty in grasping how something like consciousness could emerge from the processes of our brain, aiming to explain the intuitions that underlie this struggle. I start with an investigation of materialism, revealing that its supporters often have deep-seated dualist intuitions implicitin some of the language they use. I then question whether we can warrant the claim...
Revista Română de Filosofie Analitică
December 20, 2024
L. Zamfir
This paper explores the intersection of Yoga-Samkhya philosophy with contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. While mainstream philosophy of mind has primarily embraced physicalism, asserting that everything has an underlying physical basis, it still fails to account satisfactorily for why or how exactly consciousness, and in particular its phenomenal aspect, would arise from neural...