Mysterianism on the Frontiers of the Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science: Review of New Arguments pro et contra
Историко-философский ежегодник December 27, 2024 DOI: 10.21146/0134-8655-2024-39-236-265 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | The paper considers the applicability of McGinn's Mysterianism to the intersection of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, analyzing Vlerick and Boudry's objections to the Cognitive Closure Thesis and their proposed distinction between representational and imaginative closure, and Facchin's use of Mysterianism to address the Mark of the Cognitive Problem. |
Abstract
In this paper I will consider the applicability of the Mysterianism of Colin McGinn to that part of the contemporary Philosophy of Mind that most intersect with problems of Cognitive Science. Thus, we can also say that the subject of this paper is new arguments “pro et contra” on Mysterianism on the frontiers of the Philosophy of Mind and the Philosophy of Cognitive Science. This task will be performed on the base of two publications. The first one (by Michael Vlerick and Maarten Boudry) raises new objections to the Cognitive Closure Thesis on the Mind-Body Problem. In particular, the authors propose to refine our theory of cognitive closure by distinguishing representational closure and imaginative closure. Moreover, considerations are expressed (representational accessibility of a solution to the Mind-Body Problem to a scientific team, a metaphorical description of the relationship between mental and physical properties) that can bring us closer to solving the Problem of Consciousness. The second publication by Marco Facchin demonstrates the use of Mysterianism to solve the Mark of the Cognitive Problem, which is recognized today by many researchers as one of the main methodological and metaphilosophical problems of Cognitive Science.