The problem of consciousness: cognitive naturalism and mysterianism

Abstract

The article explores the philosophical problem of consciousness and discusses the question: “Why does consciousness exist?” Two opposing positions are considered cognitive naturalism and New Mysterianism in the context of contemporary debates on the hard problem of consciousness. The purpose of the study is to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of each approach and to outline ways of their possible reconciliation. To achieve this goal, I use a set of methods: the analytical method (analysis of key concepts and arguments), the phenomenological method (taking subjective experience as a given), the historical-philosophical method (tracing the development of views from dualism to contemporary theories), the comparative method (comparing the positions of naturalists and mysterians), the critical method (assessing the soundness of arguments), and the reflexive method (reflecting on the limits of knowledge). The results show that cognitive naturalism, based on evolutionary biology and neuroscience, offers scientific explanations for the emergence of consciousness, whereas mysterianism asserts the fundamental unknowability of the phenomenon of consciousness to the human intellect. Alternative approaches are discussed (dualism, panpsychism, information theories, eliminativism, phenomenology), as well as recent research efforts aimed at bridging the gap between objective reality and subjective experience. The conclusions indicate that although neither camp provides a final answer to the question of the nature of consciousness, their dialogue contributes to a deeper understanding of the problem. Recognizing the complexity of consciousness requires a combination of empirical optimism and epistemological humility. It is likely that the key to solving the mystery of consciousness will require new scientific paradigms that integrate both objective and subjective aspects of experience