The Impossible Problem of Consciousness: An Argument for Mysterianism
preprint DOI: 10.20944/preprints202509.1613.v1 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a complete theory linking physical processes to subjective experience is impossible because of inherent cognitive and epistemological limitations, and proposes reframing mysterianism as productive rather than defeatist. It offers two tractable research questions: the Intersubjectivity Question and the Awareness Question. |
Abstract
This essay argues for a new, constructive interpretation of mysterianism, parallel to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, repositioning it not as a defeatist philosophy but as a necessary step toward a more productive inquiry into consciousness. The essay first critiques Colin McGinn’s original argument for mysterianism, identifying its limitations, particularly in light of more recent philosophical work. It then proposes a new framework for analyzing consciousness by distinguishing between first-person (introspective) and third-person (observational) approaches. Through a critique of both, the essay demonstrates that a complete theory linking physical processes to subjective experience is impossible due to inherent cognitive and epistemological limitations. Finally, it reframes mysterianism as a pathway forward, proposing two new, tractable research questions: the Intersubjectivity Question (why we intuitively project consciousness onto others) and the Awareness Question (what the physical correlates of the functional aspect of consciousness are).