Computational neuroscience versus the Computational Theory of Mind: Why their difference matters for the possibility of artificial consciousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x25103580 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the ability to simulate the dynamics of a phenomenon using computational models does not entail that the phenomenon is literally performing the computations prescribed by the model, and that this distinction matters for the Computational Theory of Mind in consciousness studies. |
Abstract
Abstract This commentary concerns the distinction between computational modelling and computational metaphysics (i.e., the Computational Theory of Mind) in the context of consciousness studies. I argue that the ability to simulate the dynamics of a phenomenon using computational models does not entail that that phenomenon is literally performing the computations that are prescribed by the model.