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On the Hard Problem: Revisited, Re-Evaluated, Recast

David Josef Herzog, Nitsa Herzog

DOI: 10.32388/l7ssua (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that the debate over the hard problem of consciousness spans opposing camps and intermediate views, and that the authors' preferred position, grounded in classical science, may appear reductionist compared with alternatives such as quantum consciousness, many-minds explanations, or pure information-based consciousness.

Abstract

This paper is an extension of our previous article, “What is it like to be an AI bat?”[1]. Questions discussed in the first paper are quite complex and cannot be responded to in a brief, consecutive way. As a result, we divided more detailed discussion into separate topics, united under the umbrella of problems of consciousness and intelligence, artificial and natural. This first part investigates basic postulates associated with the hard problem phenomenon. There are two opposing camps that support the existence or non-existence of a hard problem, with quite a wide field between these two poles, where more opinions about different relationships of the phenomena exist. We try to create a comprehensive picture of opinions and simultaneously find the pathway through the thorny and unwelcome ground of divisive views. The mind-body problem is centuries old, and contemporary scientific views give little hope for a quick and easy compromise. There are several possible outcomes from the hard problem discussion: dual ontology persistence into the future; separation of two polar opinions into the positivist, scientifically approachable, and phenomenal, psycho-philosophical; full rejection of the hard problem as an illusory epiphenomenon, which gives little for practical research; a successful reunion of two positions as two sides of one coin or based on the third, more fundamental approach. We try to show attempts for development in all these directions, with further justification of the position firmly based on classical science. This position might look reductionist from the point of view of some novel scientific explanations, such as quantum consciousness, many minds world explanation or pure information-based consciousness. In order to limit every part of discussion by standard readable paper, we stop short of correlates of consciousness, which are discussed outside of this publication, in the next paper.

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