Intelligence and the Hard Problem of Consciousness—With ‘Dual-Aspect Theory’ Notes

The paper argues that the so-called Hard Problem of consciousness—the claim that subjective experience cannot be explained by science—is logically flawed when examined against evolution by natural selection (EvNS). The author contends that while many researchers dismiss the Hard Problem as absurd or intractable without detailed analysis, a firm assessment shows its logic is unsound, leaving EvNS available for exploring consciousness. The paper further proposes that an 'information theory' dual-aspect approach is best suited to resolving claims like the Hard Problem.

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Abstract

To model informatic intelligence, agency, consciousness and the like, one must address a claimed Hard Problem: that a grasp of ‘the mind’ lies wholly beyond scientific views. While this claim is suspect, persistent analogues can be identified in the literature, such as a “symbol grounding problem”, “solving intelligence”, a missing “theory of meaning”, and more. The topic of subjective phenomena thus still holds sway in many corners as being unresolved. But firm analysis of Hard Problem claims is rare; researchers instead respond intuitively, claiming that (1) it is an absurd view unworthy of study, or (2) it is an intractable issue defying study, where neither side offers much clarifying detail. In contrast, this paper firmly assesses the Hard Problem’s claim contra one scientific role: evolution by means of natural selection (EvNS). It examines the specific logic behind this claim, as seen in the literature over the years. The paper ultimately shows that the Hard Problem’s logic is deeply flawed, with the further implication that EvNS remains available for exploring consciousness. The paper also suggests that an ‘information theory’ dual-aspect approach is best suited to resolving Hard-Problem-like claims.