The Relevance of Freud’s Project (1895–1896) for Husserlian Phenomenology
June 12, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/9780197793619.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Historical analysis |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology and Husserl's genetic phenomenology belong to a shared history of psycho-physical parallelism, and that Husserl sought a scientific supplement to phenomenology—an authentic "somatology" and a "transcendental Biology." The chapter proposes analogies between these projects and recent sciences of embodied consciousness, as well as thematic connections between Freud's model of consciousness and those of Mark Solms and Karl Friston. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter reviews the history of psycho-physical parallelism with a concentration on the context and unfolding of Freud’s 1895–1896 Project for a Scientific Psychology and later on genetic phenomenology. Contextualization includes Herbart’s “reduction” of acts of consciousness to dynamic, mathematizable units; Mach’s bodies approached in their worlds; and Brentano’s approach to time as productive imagination—important preliminaries to Freud and Husserl. The chapter discusses Husserl’s search for a science liable to supplement the descriptions of his phenomenology, from the 1916 Ideas III (searching for authentic “somatology”) to his idea of a “transcendental Biology” (Appendix 23, Crisis). From a discussion of the limits of descriptivism, the chapter points to analogies with more recent sciences of embodied consciousness, starting from the 1990s (Andy Clark, Randall Beer). This chapter introduces contemporary thematic connections found between Freud’s model of consciousness and that of Mark Solms and Karl Friston.