On the neural mechanisms subserving consciousness and attention.
Frontiers in Psychology 2011 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00397 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Meg Attention Consciousness Electrophysiology FMRI Imaging Vision |
| Key findings | Consciousness and attention rely on distinct neural properties, although they can interact at the behavioral level. |
Abstract
Consciousness, as described in the experimental literature, is a multi-faceted phenomenon, that impinges on other well-studied concepts such as attention and control. Do consciousness and attention refer to different aspects of the same core phenomenon, or do they correspond to distinct functions? One possibility to address this question is to examine the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness and attention. If consciousness and attention pertain to the same concept, they should rely on shared neural mechanisms. Conversely, if their underlying mechanisms are distinct, then consciousness and attention should be considered as distinct entities. This paper therefore reviews neurophysiological facts arguing in favor or against a tight relationship between consciousness and attention. Three neural mechanisms that have been associated with both attention and consciousness are examined (neural amplification, involvement of the fronto-parietal network, and oscillatory synchrony), to conclude that the commonalities between attention and consciousness at the neural level may have been overestimated. Last but not least, experiments in which both attention and consciousness were probed at the neural level point toward a dissociation between the two concepts. It therefore appears from this review that consciousness and attention rely on distinct neural properties, although they can interact at the behavioral level. It is proposed that a "cumulative influence model," in which attention and consciousness correspond to distinct neural mechanisms feeding a single decisional process leading to behavior, fits best with available neural and behavioral data. In this view, consciousness should not be considered as a top-level executive function but should rather be defined by its experiential properties.
Citations in the library
Cited by 22
- Consciousness in humans and non-human animals: recent advances and future directions Frontiers in Psychology 2013
- Neural correlates of nondual awareness in meditation. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 2014
- Intensive training induces longitudinal changes in meditation state-related EEG oscillatory activity. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2012
- The olfactory system as the gateway to the neural correlates of consciousness Frontiers in Psychology 2014
- Where's My Consciousness-Ometer? How to Test for the Presence and Complexity of Consciousness. Perspectives on Psychological Science July 1, 2022
and 17 more in the library
Cites 19
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness The MIT Press eBooks March 26, 1996
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007
- Opposing effects of attention and consciousness on afterimages Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences April 27, 2010
- The relationship between awareness and attention: evidence from ERP responses. Neuropsychologia November 1, 2009
and 14 more in the library