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The Struggle to Distinguish Transcendental Phenomenology and Psychology

Christopher Gutland, Alexander Nicolai Wendt

Journal für Psychologie July 1, 2023 DOI: 10.30820/0942-2285-2023-1-103 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 3
Key points Argues that Husserl's distinction between transcendental phenomenology and eidetic psychology remained problematic, so that his analyses are often valuable psychological contributions mistakenly taken as epistemology. Contends that confusing epistemological and psychological investigations harbors the danger of psychologism, and proposes ways to methodologically separate the two while making Husserl's psychological work fruitful for a phenomenological psychology.

Abstract

This article addresses Husserl’s attempt to differentiate between transcendental phenomenology and eidetic psychology. The thesis is: The distinction remained problematic so that Husserl’s analyses are often valuable contributions to psychology that, however, are mistaken to be epistemology. It is shown how and why the confusion of epistemological and psychological investigations harbors the danger of a psychologism. The article shows how becoming conscious of consciousness leads to a kind of reduplication of the world and why this led Husserl to give psychology an epistemological priority. On the other hand, it considers where and how the concern of epistemology and psychological investigations on the genesis of consciousness can be methodologically separated. Finally, it offers perspectives on how Husserl’s psychological contributions can be made fruitful for the project of a phenomenological psychology.

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