Abstract The chapter addresses the ego as a legacy of idealism and in light of Avenarius’s critiques of it. It compares the function and history of the ‘ego’ in Freud’s neurology and in Husserl’s evolving phenomenology, wherein the ego was firstly ‘absolute subjectivity’ (1905) only to grow more complex in Ideas I and II. This chapter discusses how Husserl’s turn to the phenomenological subject...
Abstract This chapter explores Husserl’s innovative conception of immanent time in three parts: retention, now-moments, and protention. It explains his advance relative to Brentano’s conception of time and memory being the result of “productive imagination.” Early on, it demonstrates that sensation, welling up from the body, both accounted for our feeling of temporal flow and depended on that...
Abstract This chapter reviews the history of psycho-physical parallelism with a concentration on the context and unfolding of Freud’s 1895–1896 Project for a Scientific Psychology and later on genetic phenomenology. Contextualization includes Herbart’s “reduction” of acts of consciousness to dynamic, mathematizable units; Mach’s bodies approached in their worlds; and Brentano’s approach to time...