From Neurophysiological Correlates to Ontological Verdicts: An Epistemological Critique of Nonordinary Experiences of Consciousness
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AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that neuropsychological descriptions of nonordinary experiences—such as out-of-body and near-death experiences—do not by themselves authorize reducing those experiences to hallucination or to events lacking phenomenological, clinical, transformative, or epistemic value. Proposes a multilevel model distinguishing phenomenological, neurobiological, clinical, symbolic-cultural, epistemic, and ontological levels, and contends that automatically reductionist interpretations rest on metaphysical assumptions that should be declared and critically examined. |
Abstract
Nonordinary experiences of consciousness, including out-of-body experiences, near-death experiences, mystical states, psychedelic experiences, and profound alterations of self-experience, are often interpreted through neuropsychological and psychiatric categories such as hallucination, dissociation, perceptual alteration, or brain anomaly. Such categories are clinically necessary when the experience is associated with distress, functional impairment, interpretive rigidity, or risk. However, they become epistemologically problematic when a neurophysiological correlate is transformed, without further argument, into a definitive ontological conclusion. This article offers a theoretical-conceptual narrative review of the relationship between consciousness, phenomenology, neuroscience, psychiatry, out-of-body experiences, near-death experiences, and non-reductionist epistemological frameworks. Its central thesis is that the neuropsychological description of an experience does not, by itself, authorize its ontological reduction to hallucination or to an event devoid of phenomenological, clinical, transformative, or epistemic value. Drawing on the literature on neural correlates of consciousness, phenomenology, neurophenomenology, appraisal of nonordinary experiences, differential diagnosis, OBEs, and NDE/REDs, the article proposes a multilevel model that distinguishes phenomenological description, neurobiological correlates, clinical-functional assessment, symbolic-cultural context, epistemic assumptions, and ontological openness. The aim is not to demonstrate the existence of parallel realities, the survival of consciousness, or the objective veridicality of extracorporeal perceptions, but to show that automatically reductionist interpretations of such experiences are not epistemically neutral. They depend on metaphysical assumptions that should be declared, discussed, and subjected to the same critical scrutiny required of nonordinary hypotheses.