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The psychopathology of metaphysics: Depersonalization and the problem of reality

Alexandre Billon

Metaphilosophy 2024 DOI: 10.1111/meta.12666 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that the "intuition of unreality"—the sense that the perceived world is shallow or unreal—should be rejected and diagnosed as a pathology, using late nineteenth-century psychiatric studies of "metaphysician doubters." On this basis the author rejects recent metaphysical doctrines that draw on that intuition, such as structuralism, digitalism, and virtual realism.

Abstract

AbstractAccording to a common philosophical intuition, the deep nature of things is hidden from us, and the world as we know it through perception and science is, just like a dream, shadows, or a computer simulation, somehow shallow and lacking in reality. This “intuition of unreality” clashes with a strong, but perhaps more naive, intuition to the effect that the world as we know it seems perfectly real. Shadows, dreams, or informational structures appear too unreal to be identical to the world as we know it! This clash between the two intuitions forms the basis of the “problem of reality.” In the late nineteenth century psychiatrists encountered patients they referred to as “metaphysician doubters” who constantly questioned the reality of the world. This essay draws on studies of these patients in order to reject, and indeed diagnose, the intuition of unreality and recent metaphysical doctrines drawing on it, such as structuralism, digitalism, and virtual realism.

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