Hard problems in the philosophy of mind
Qeios March 1, 2023 DOI: 10.32388/vwplua (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe paper examines hard problems in the philosophy of mind, particularly the challenge of explaining subjective conscious experience (qualia) within a physicalist framework. It argues that standard functional and representational theories fail to account for the first-person character of consciousness, and suggests that such problems may require a revision of our metaphysical assumptions rather than further empirical investigation.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that hard problems in the philosophy of mind remain unresolved due to conceptual complexity and the limits of current explanatory frameworks, requiring deeper philosophical analysis rather than empirical solutions alone. |
Abstract
Hard problems in the philosophy of mind