Introspection in the Disordered Mind: And the Superintrospectionitis Thesis
Alexandre Billon
Journal of Consciousness Studies September 30, 2023 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.30.9.049 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Introspection Wonder Depersonalization Argumentation theory Epistemology Virtue Cognitive psychology Function biology Cognitive science |
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that the 'superintrospectionitis thesis'—that people with schizophrenia or depersonalization disorder have superior introspective abilities—is not supported, and offers conceptual distinctions to refine the understanding of introspection. |
Abstract
In their target article, Kammerer and Frankish (K&F) wonder what forms introspection could take in non-human animals, enhanced humans, artificial intelligences, and aliens. In this short note, I focus on disordered or neurodiverse minds. More specifically, I assess a claim that has often been made more or less implicitly to the effect that, in virtue of their conditions, people with schizophrenia or depersonalization disorder have superior introspective abilities that allow them to discern some important but normally hidden characteristics of our experiences — call this the superintrospectionitis thesis. In the course of my argumentation, I introduce distinctions and questions concerning the nature of the architecture and the function of introspection that might enrich K&F's framework.