Experiences of derealization A naive realist account
Philosophical Psychology December 19, 2025 DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2025.2606142 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Derealization Metatheory Phenomenology philosophy Epistemology Psychoanalysis |
| Key points | Argues that naive realism can accommodate derealization by proposing that such experiences are constituted by perceptual relations to external objects but involve existentially degraded relations, where perception makes the object available without its existence, structured by background feelings of unreality. |
Abstract
A major symptom of “Derealization/Depersonalization Disorder” is derealization. People who experience derealization report a sense of unreality when it comes to their surroundings, yet they still perceive those surroundings. How can this possibly be accommodated by a naive realist theory of experience – a theory on which the real external world is central to explaining the phenomenology of perception? I develop this question into a new problem for naive realism: the problem of derealization. But I argue that the naive realist can respond to this by offering an account of perceptual experiences of derealization. On the account I propose, such experiences are constituted by perceptual relations to external objects, but involve existentially degraded relations. This involves perceiving an object in such a way that one’s perception makes the object available to one without its existence. Perception can become degraded in this way, I suggest, when it is structured by background feelings of unreality.