Phenomenal consciousness and moral status: taking the moral option
Philosophical Psychology April 8, 2024 DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2024.2339353 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that moral status is partly determinative of phenomenal consciousness and that phenomenal consciousness is sufficient for moral status, a position the author calls the "moral option." The author claims this view helps resolve the distribution problem of determining which systems are phenomenally conscious and defends it against objections, including three based on previous theories linking phenomenal consciousness and moral status. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT Intuitively, there is a close link between moral status and phenomenal consciousness. Taking the link seriously can serve as the basis of a proposal that appears to have a surprising number of theoretical benefits. This proposal is the moral option, according to which moral status is partly determinative of phenomenal consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness is sufficient for possession of a moral property I refer to as “moral status.” I argue for this view on the basis of its ability to shed light on the distribution problem of determining which systems are phenomenally conscious. I explicate it by drawing on a theory of attributions of phenomenal consciousness, and considering its relationship to positions on the metaphysics of consciousness. I defend it against a series of objections, including three based on previous theories of the link between phenomenal consciousness and moral status. The moral option should, in my view, be a serious contender among theories of phenomenal consciousness.