Causal Qualia: A Constraint Theory of Phenomenal Interior
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AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that privacy alone cannot explain phenomenal experience and that hidden information, internal integration, or computational complexity are insufficient. Proposes that phenomenality plausibly occurs only in systems satisfying a specific conjunction of architectural conditions, including bounded interior horizon, self-indexed modeling, embodied homeostatic coupling, valence, ownership binding, cross-layer coherence, grounding in body-world interaction, and temporally persistent causal memory. |
Abstract
Why internal information processing should ever be accompanied by phenomenal experience remains one of the central questions in philosophy of mind. Yet the hard problem is often posed in a form so broad that it obscures distinctions that matter theoretically. This article develops a constraint-based approach intended to sharpen that terrain. Rather than attempting to derive consciousness outright, it separates several structural questions that are frequently conated with phenomenality itself, including the privacy of experience, partial self-opacity, and rst-person asymmetry, treating each as a consequence of bounded causal organization rather than as a brute metaphysical given. The central claim is that privacy alone cannot explain phenomenality. Hidden information, internal integration, or computational complexity are not sucient. What matters is the organization of interior state within a causal architecture in which an embodied agent models its own condition under bounded access, regulatory dependence, and aective stakes. On this basis, the paper proposes a candidate architecture for phenomenal interior consisting of a bounded interior horizon, self-indexed modeling, embodied homeostatic coupling, valence, ownership binding, cross-layer coherence, grounding in bodyworld interaction, and temporally persistent causal memory. A compact formal scaold is introduced to clarify the conceptual relations among these components, and the framework is evaluated through stress cases including acute pain, anesthesia, dissociation, locked-in syndrome, and contemporary large language models. The argument does not claim to solve the hard problem denitively. It advances instead a constraint theory: if phenomenality occurs, it plausibly occurs only in systems satisfying a specic conjunction of architectural conditions. The remaining question is correspondingly narrower than the classical formulation not why there is experience at all, but whether this structural conjunction approaches suciency for phenomenal character or remains a necessary precondition that still admits dark-information instances.