The Mind: From Cartesian Dualism to Piccinini’s Computational Functionalism
Philosophy International Journal July 1, 2024 DOI: 10.23880/phij-16000333 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe mind has been understood through many competing philosophical theories, including classical materialism, dualism, behaviorism, functionalism, and computational functionalism. Key debates center on the mind-body problem, the subjectivity of mental states, and the challenge of knowing other minds. The paper contrasts views from Aristotle, Descartes, Wittgenstein, U.T. Place, Gilbert Ryle, and Hilary Putnam, exploring how each theory shapes our understanding of consciousness, mental phenomena, and human experience.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy |
| Key finding | Argues that philosophical theories of mind—from dualism to functionalism—offer diverse and competing frameworks for understanding mental phenomena, consciousness, and the nature of human experience. |
Abstract
The concept of the mind in philosophy encompasses a diverse range of theories and perspectives, examining its immaterial nature, unitary function, self-activity, self-consciousness, and persistence despite bodily changes. This paper explores the attributes of the mind, addressing classical materialism, dualism, and behaviorism, along with contemporary theories like functionalism and computational functionalism. Key philosophical debates include the mind-body problem, the subjectivity of mental states, and the epistemological and conceptual challenges in understanding other minds. Contrasting views from Aristotle, Descartes, Wittgenstein, and modern philosophers like U.T. Place, Gilbert Ryle, and Hilary Putnam are analyzed. The paper also discusses the implications of these theories on our understanding of mental phenomena, consciousness, and the nature of human experience.