Soul and Body in Aristotle's Theory of Perception
Joshua Trubowitz, J. Stern, Evan Sommers, T. Holden, Steven M. Nadler, D. Ferguson, M. Nance, John J. Drummond, G. Catapano, James J. Dicenso, J. Greig, Christopher Litwin, Juan Carlos González, Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, F. Zamboni, Mitia Rioux-Beaulne, S. Bremner
Journal of the history of philosophy March 31, 2026 DOI: 10.1353/hph.2026.a986602 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that for Aristotle, perception's psychological and physiological aspects are judgment/discrimination and receptivity, not phenomenal consciousness and its material basis. Proposes that Aristotle divides perception's active and passive aspects between soul and body, with sense organs providing receptivity and the soul enabling judgment. |
Abstract
abstract:A widespread view has it that, for Aristotle, perception's psychological and physiological aspects are phenomenal consciousness and its underlying material basis. I argue on the contrary that they are judgment/discrimination and receptivity: in virtue of our sense organs, we are receptive to objects of perception; in virtue of our souls, we judge or discriminate these objects. In effect, Aristotle divides perception's active and passive aspects between soul and body. I defend this view with special attention to Aristotle's claim that our senses receive form without matter in perception.