Subjective experience and moral standing
Animal Sentience August 10, 2016 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1136 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractKlein & Barron's analysis examines the capacity for subjective experience in insects, not specifically pleasure or pain. They note that insects have traditionally been thought incapable of such experience. If future research shows some insect species are conscious but cannot feel pain, a philosophical question arises that ethicists have not addressed: whether a conscious creature lacking pain sensitivity has moral standing.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that if insects are conscious but incapable of feeling pain, a new ethical question emerges about moral standing. |
Abstract
Klein & Barron’s analysis focuses on the capacity for any subjective experience at all. It does not seek to demonstrate that insects can experience pleasure and pain in particular. This would be something of which insects have not traditionally been thought capable. If further research were to demonstrate that one or more insect species turn out to be conscious, yet incapable of experiencing pleasure and pain, it would give rise to a philosophical question that ethicists have yet to answer: Would a creature that is conscious, but lacks the capacity to feel pain, have moral standing?