3 papers in the library · 34 citations · publishing 1994-2009
Perception and Cognition February 26, 2009 Gary Hatfield
Abstract I am a qualia realist. I believe that specifically phenomenal qualia are present in perception. Thus, when we see a yellow lemon in good light, we typically see that it is yellow by experiencing a yellow quale. We can experience (an instance of) the same yellow quale in the absence of the lemon, or of any yellow object. In my view, not only is the experience of the lemon’s quality real...
Perception and Cognition February 26, 2009 Gary Hatfield
Abstract In the latter part of the nineteenth century, philosophers, physicists, and the new psychologists agreed to this extent in their conceptions of the mind – body problem: they all had a healthy respect for the integrity of both the mental and the physical domains. Whatever their particular commitments, whether phenomenalist, dualist, or materialist, they all accepted the reality of both...
Philosophical Psychology 1994 William Epstein, Gary Hatfield 34 citations
The Gestalt psychologists adopted a set of positions on mind‐body issues that seem like an odd mix. They sought to combine a version of naturalism and physiological reductionism with an insistence on the reality of the phenomenal and the attribution of meanings to objects as natural characteristics. After reviewing basic positions in contemporary philosophy of mind, we examine the Gestalt...