Categorical Phenomenology
The Anatomy of Experience December 12, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/9780197790151.003.0008 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractCareful introspection reveals that both categorical perception and pure noncategorical thisness are relatively empty. Categorical perception is the experience of generality, that something is an instance, but being an instance comes to very little because our experience of the scope of categories is partial and incomplete. Using a thought experiment about brain-grayers (hypothetical people who are sightless from birth), the experience of noncategorical thisness also comes to very little, because every human experience includes categorical perception as well as thisness. Any attempt to describe thisness apart from categorical perception fails to capture what our experience is actually like.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that both categorical perception and noncategorical thisness are relatively "empty" because categorical perception involves incomplete awareness of category scope and every human experience includes both elements, making pure thisness indescribable. |
Abstract
Abstract Careful introspection reveals that both categorical perception and pure noncategorical thisness are relatively “empty.” Categorical perception is the experience of generality, that something is an instance. But being an instance comes to very little because our experience of the scope of categories, the range of things that can be categorized as dog or as pink, for example, is so partial and incomplete. Relatedly, as illustrated using a thought experiment about “brain-grayers” (hypothetical people who are sightless from birth), the experience of noncategorical thisness comes to very little as well, because every human experience includes categorical perception as well as thisness. Any attempt to describe thisness apart from CP fails to capture what our experience is actually like.