The Perspectivity of Feeling
Nathaniel F. Barrett, Les Éditions Chromatika
chromatikon 2010 DOI: 10.5840/chromatikon201067 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that process panpsychism, by framing the explanatory gap in terms of the particularity of feeling, allows consciousness to be understood as an evolutionary process, and that the elusiveness of feeling may be essential to its functionality. |
Abstract
For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the explanatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibility of special, experiential properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms of the particularity of feeling. While the particularity of feeling cannot be captured by third-person accounts, for this very reason it is amenable to understanding consciousness as an evolutionary process. Thus it may turn out that the elusiveness of feeling is essential to its functionality.