The Perspectivity of Feeling: Process Panpsychism and the Explanatory Gap
Process Studies October 1, 2009 DOI: 10.2307/44798486 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that process panpsychism, by understanding the explanatory gap through the particularity of feeling rather than inaccessible experiential properties, allows consciousness to be seen as an evolutionary process, and proposes that the elusiveness of feeling may be essential to its functionality. |
Abstract
Abstract For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the exphnatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibility of special, "experiential" properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms of the particularity of feeling. While the particularity of feeling cannot be captured by third-person accounts, for this very reason it is amenable to understanding consciousness as an evolutionary process. Thus it may turn out that the elusiveness of feeling is essential to its functionality.