Petrus Hispanus Lectures 2003. The harder problem of consciousness
November 1, 2003 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2003-0007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that there exists a distinct philosophical problem of consciousness, the Harder Problem, which is more epistemological in nature than the Hard Problem, concerning how we can know or justify claims about conscious experience. |
Abstract
T. H. Huxley famously said ‘How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.’ We do not see how to explain a state of consciousness in terms of its neurological basis. This is the Hard Problem of Consciousness. The aim of this paper is to present another problem of consciousness. The Harder Problem as I will call it is more epistemological than the