So This Is What It's Like
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge 2007 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the ability hypothesis provides a resilient account of knowing what it's like, explaining its cognitive role and connection to firsthand experience, despite strong objections inspired by the Knowledge Argument. |
Abstract
AbstractThis chapter focuses on the objective grounds for and against the ability hypothesis (AH), which was developed as a response to the Knowledge Argument (KA) — a purported proof of the existence of “phenomenal information”. It argues that while KA capitalizes on the mysticism inspired by “So this is what it's like” and embraces the existence of propositional knowledge that cannot be put into words, AH provides a more worldly account that explains both the cognitive role of knowing what it's like and its essential connection with firsthand experience. This approach engenders almost religious objection. But the test of a philosophical theory is not the fervor of the criticism it engenders, but the strength of the available rejoinders; and AH proves to be reasonably resilient to assault.