Experience as a Way of Knowing: The Knowledge Argument and Qualia
Journal of Human Cognition 2024 DOI: 10.47297/wspjhcwsp2515-469901.20240801 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that qualia are theoretical postulates rather than necessary entities, and that the subjectivity and phenomenality of experience can be explained without positing apparent properties. Proposes that experiencing is a form of knowing, so Mary's new knowledge upon release is knowledge by acquaintance with red. |
Abstract
It is first shown that many questions could be raised about phenomenal concepts and the popular answer to the question what Mary learns upon release, namely, that this is what it is like to see red. It is then shown that the category of quale is actually a postulate of philosophical theories and philosophers posit qualia because they fail to see how to account for the two related features of experience, namely, subjectivity and phenomenality. It is argued that we don't need qualia to explain the subjectivity and phenomenality of experience because we don't have to posit apparent properties. It is then proposed that experiencing is a way of knowing and that the new knowledge Mary acquires upon release is her knowledge by acquaintance with red.