Of "qualia" and "what it is like"
Journal of Human Cognition 2024 DOI: 10.47297/wspjhcwsp2515-469902.20240801 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the author of "Experience as a Way of Knowing" underestimated the complexity of debates about qualia and "what it is like," and challenges the author's treatment of the knowledge argument, interpretation of "what-it-is-like" talk, view that phenomenal properties are theoretical postulates, rejection of "apparent properties," and readings of several knowledge-argument authors. |
Abstract
In "Experience as a Way of Knowing" (this journal), the author tries to create some troubles for philosophers who believe in "qualia" or "what it is like". I think the author has underestimated the complexity of the issues, and I will voice my concerns in five sections. Besides presenting my interpretation of the author's position and challenging it, I will (1) challenge the author's treatment of the knowledge argument, especially the author's treatment of " this is what it is like to see red", (2) challenge the author's interpretation of "what-it-is-like" talk and the author's view that phenomenal properties are theoretical postulates, (3) challenge the author's rejection of "apparent properties", and (4) point out some issues with the author's interpretation of several authors who write about the knowledge argument.