Constructivism for Consciousness

Abstract

The goal of this essay is to promote a non‐traditional physicalism for consciousness much as metaethical constructivisms are meant as naturalistic alternatives to traditional moral realism. The account on offer is based on a perspectival version of David Lewis's Humean “best‐system” account for scientific representation. On this version, suspect concepts are vindicated (from the perspective of a given science) when their use is required for ideal systematization. Lewis's important case, his hard problem, was to provide an Humean vindication of chance insofar as it is a required aspect of ideal physics, the best way (from the perspective of fundamental physics) to give a summary description of regularities. The present essay utilizes Michael Graziano's account of consciousness as proof‐of‐concept. Personal‐level psychology, if Graziano is correct, is best based on a brain schema evolved to systematize attention. This schema would seem to be precisely right for the perspectival best system: a “summary description” (Graziano's term also) requiring an awareness concept. I argue that the required concept is indeed both subjective and phenomenal so properly termed “awareness.” Moreover, even if Graziano's account is not correct, the constructivist approach described illustrates a new explanatory option for physicalism about the mind.