ISSN 2153-9596
4 papers in the library · 2 citations · publishing 2026
Analytic Philosophy July 9, 2026 Jeffrey J. Watson
ABSTRACT I offer a variation on the Knowledge Argument, the “Resemblance Argument,” which argues that the accuracy conditions for representations of qualia require qualitative resemblance to the mode of presentation, whereas those for representations of physical states do not. The Resemblance Argument resists a number of popular current responses to the Knowledge Argument, including the Ability...
Analytic Philosophy April 20, 2026 John F. Halpin
The goal of this essay is to promote a non‐traditional physicalism for consciousness much as metaethical constructivisms are meant as naturalistic alternatives to traditional moral realism. The account on offer is based on a perspectival version of David Lewis's Humean “best‐system” account for scientific representation. On this version, suspect concepts are vindicated (from the perspective of...
Analytic Philosophy February 11, 2026 David Builes, Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello 2 citations
ABSTRACT What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? While it is popular to think that our most basic conscious experiences are temporally extended, we will be arguing against this view, on the grounds that it makes our conscious experiences depend on the future in an implausible way. We then defend an alternative view of the temporal structure of experience from a variety of...
Analytic Philosophy February 11, 2026 Andrew Y. Lee
ABSTRACT I develop and defend a sense‐datum theory of perception. My theory follows the spirit of classic sense‐datum theories: I argue that what it is to have a perceptual experience is to be acquainted with some sense‐data , where sense‐data are private particulars that have all the properties they appear to have, that are common to both perception and hallucination, that constitute the...