Analytic Philosophy - The Consciousness Library

A Knowledge Argument Without “Knowledge”

Analytic Philosophy July 9, 2026 Jeffrey J. Watson

The Knowledge Argument against physicalism holds that knowing all physical facts about color vision does not entail knowing what it is like to see red. This paper offers a variation called the Resemblance Argument, which shifts the focus from knowledge to representation. It argues that accurate mental representations of qualia (subjective experiences) require qualitative resemblance to the way those experiences are presented, whereas representations of physical states do not. Because popular physicalist responses to the Knowledge Argument—such as the Ability hypothesis, the Acquaintance hypothesis, and the New Knowledge of an Old Fact strategy—address knowledge rather than representation, they fail against this new argument. However, some physicalist responses, including Illusionism and the Incomplete Physical Knowledge Strategy, remain viable.

DOI: 10.1111/phib.70018 Qualia Physicalism Argument complex analysis Focus optics +7

A Theory of Sense‐Data

Analytic Philosophy February 11, 2026 Andrew Y. Lee

A sense-datum theory of perception is developed and defended. Perceptual experiences involve acquaintance with sense-data, which are private particulars that have all the properties they appear to have, are common to perception and hallucination, constitute phenomenal character, and are analogous to internal pictures. The theory diverges from classic versions in three ways: sense-data are neural states presented first-personally; their sensational qualities differ from the sensible qualities of external objects; and sense-data are the vehicles of perception, not the objects perceived. This package is argued to be a viable contemporary position in philosophy of perception.

DOI: 10.1111/phib.70000 Philosophy of mind Perception Virtue Key lock +4

Papers

A Knowledge Argument Without “Knowledge”

A Theory of Sense‐Data