Neurophenomenal structuralism as a general theory of consciousness?

Abstract

While neurophenomenal structuralism (NPS) is typically viewed as an account of why an experience, i.e. a conscious mental state, has a specific phenomenal character, Sascha Fink has suggested that NPS might also account for why one has an experience in the first place. According to Fink, the character-determining structures are incorporated in larger (meta-)structures that make the incorporated structures conscious, while also contributing their own Gestalt-related phenomenology. We examine the commitments of such generalized ‘NPS+’, formulating three challenges for Fink’s approach. According to the unconsciously perceived gist objection, there is evidence for unconscious Gestalten, which suggests that the Gestalt-forming mechanism fails to make the relevant mental state conscious. Moreover, the existence of Ganzfeld experiences suggests that some experiences lack Gestalt-structures. Thirdly, as we explain, proponents of one-factor NPS+ face the mirroring dilemma of having to choose between a vicious regress of incorporating structures, and compromising their theory’s methodological promise. We then formulate two challenges for any two-factor form of NPS+: The more of the same challenge concerns the question of why adding more structures to content-related structural features makes these features conscious, while the structure-selection challenge concerns the question of why some neural structures, but not others, are selected for consciousness.