“Something that befalls us”: Phenomenology as undergoing

Abstract

This essay addresses a tension at the heart of the phenomenological method, namely the idea that phenomenology is both a method and an experience – it is both something we do and something we undergo. This dual understanding of the method generates questions as to how to best understand it. The above epigraphs are testament to the fact that the phenomenological reduction is not only something we perform; it is also something that can happen to us – or “descend” upon us – leaving us in a state of generative disorientation. While the reduction is typically conceived as the heart of the phenomenological method, this paper explores a reading of the reduction that foregrounds its existential force as much as its methodological significance. This reading is not new; its origin lies in part with Eugen Fink, Edmund Husserl’s research assistant from 1928 till Husserl’s death in 1938, but it has carried forward in critical phenomenology, phenomenology of illness (Carel 2016), and Latinx feminisms (Martinez 2014, Grimm 2024). This narrative continues to grant the phenomenological reduction – and the epochē in particular – pride of place at the heart of the method. Crucially, however, in the lineage traced here, the epochē is conceived not only as a central aspect of phenomenological method, but also as an existential undergoing. Attending to the existential aspects of the epochē is vital if we are to come to grips with why and how phenomenology changes us, and with the transformative aspects of the method. The question as to how phenomenology changes us is central for critical phenomenology, wherein phenomenology has an ameliorative, and not only descriptive, potential.