Applied phenomenology: why it is safe to ignore the epoché

The necessity of performing the epoché and reduction for a proper phenomenological investigation is debated within both phenomenological philosophy and qualitative research. Amedeo Giorgi argues that no scientific research can claim phenomenological status without some use of these methods, basing this claim on Husserl's writings on phenomenological psychology. This paper discusses Husserl's ideas and argues that while the epoché and reduction are crucial for transcendental phenomenology, their relevance for non-philosophical applications of phenomenology is much more questionable.

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Abstract

The question of whether a proper phenomenological investigation and analysis requires one to perform the epoché and the reduction has not only been discussed within phenomenological philosophy. It is also very much a question that has been hotly debated within qualitative research. Amedeo Giorgi, in particular, has insisted that no scientific research can claim phenomenological status unless it is supported by some use of the epoché and reduction. Giorgi partially bases this claim on ideas found in Husserl’s writings on phenomenological psychology. In the present paper, I discuss Husserl’s ideas and argue that while the epoché and the reduction are crucial for transcendental phenomenology, it is much more questionable whether they are also relevant for a non-philosophical application of phenomenology.