Overview: The Hard Problem Resolved
Dennis Nicholson
Psychology Archives September 1, 2026 DOI: 10.23668/psycharchives.22439 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that the hard problem of consciousness is resolvable because conscious experiences are ontologically reducible to brain states, with their irreducible knowledge content being a perspectival artifact. Proposes that a conscious experience and its brain state are the same physical thing known in irreconcilably different ways, eliminating the explanatory gap. |
Abstract
Overview chapter of a book that argues that the hard problem of consciousness is epistemological, perspectival, and resolvable, rather than ontological and irresolvable. The brain as we see and otherwise sense it is the reality as known rather than the reality as such. If the same is true of our conscious experiences, it becomes possible that the hard problem is epistemological and resolvable. Conscious experiences may be ontologically reducible to certain brain states but have knowledge content that, for purely perspectival reasons, is epistemologically irreducible to an outside observer's knowledge of the brain states. If so, there is no hard problem, no explanatory gap. Everything about a conscious experience, including its irreducible knowledge content, is subsumed within the reality known to an outside observer as a brain state and everything about it – including why it is 'like this' and why it is 'like anything' – can be identified and explained in externally observed terms. (The brain states should be unique in ways that will make the resulting accounts plausible and satisfactory.). We need not explain how the brain states transform themselves into the conscious experiences. This does not happen, except through a shift in perspective. A particular conscious experience and brain state are simply the same physical thing known in irreconcilably different ways. A full account of a given conscious experience and brain state consists of a full external observer's explanation of the brain state mapped to our irreducible inner view of what the conscious experience is like (relatively trivial information but essential to a complete account).
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |