Consciousness: Removing the Hardness and Solving the Problem
J. Shand
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia January 31, 2022 DOI: 10.17990/rpf/2021_77_4_1279 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the 'hard' problem of consciousness stems not from metaphysics but from an epistemic definition of the physical as only what can be known combined with the claim that only objective properties are real. Proposes that physicalism can be retained while allowing some physical properties to be known subjectively, which would eliminate the hard problem. |
Abstract
The ‘hard’ problem of consciousness is the seemingly intractable one of explaining the properties of consciousness in terms of the properties of physical objects. This is often seen mistakenly as a metaphysical problem, whereby the properties of physical things are of such a nature and so unlike mental properties that it is difficult to understand how the physical could ever explain consciousness. This view of the physical is not however the true reason for the hardness of the problem, rather it is epistemic, that of defining the physical as those features of the world that may be known objectively, coupled with the contention that only those objectively known properties are real. This makes the explanation of subjective consciousness in terms physical properties not just hard but impossible. The answer is to hold that the world is indeed all physical, but have the physical no longer defined as what may be known only objectively, and hold that some physical properties may be known subjectively. This eliminates the hard problem of consciousness as it is no longer required that the explanation of subjective properties of physical things be in terms of the objective properties of physical things.