Phenomenal consciousness in insects? A possible way forward
Animal Sentience August 3, 2026 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1159 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Evolution Cognitive neuroscience Zoology Cognition and perception Life sciences |
| Key points | Argues that Klein and Barron's midbrain-based account of subjective experience is flawed, and proposes that the capacity for subjective experience should be assessed through fundamental neural computations, specifically metarepresentations and high-level representations entering working memory. |
Abstract
Klein & Barron (2016) propose that subjective experience in humans arises in the midbrain and then argue that insects have the capacity for subjective experience because their nervous system can perform neural processing similar to that of the midbrain. This approach ultimately fails because it is built on the false premise that the midbrain is the source of the awareness of sensory stimuli. I instead propose that the capacity for subjective experience must be based on fundamental neural computations that generate the “what it feels like” experience. Two such computations associated with metarepresentations and high level representations entering working memory are discussed as possible measures of the capacity for subjective experience.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 7
- Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems Nature Reviews Neuroscience April 20, 2016
- SYNTHETIC PHENOMENOLOGY International Journal of Machine Consciousness May 19, 2009
- Insects have the capacity for subjective experience 2016
- Simulating visual qualia in the CERA-CRANIUM cognitive architecture. Advances in experimental medicine and biology 2011
- Know thyself: metacognitive networks and measures of consciousness. Cognition November 2010
and 2 more in the library