Why fish pain cannot and should not be ruled out
Animal Sentience 2016 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1038 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Fish <actinopterygii> Key lock Cognitive psychology Cognitive science Fishery Computer security |
| Citations | 49 |
| Key points | Argues that the strategy of identifying human neural mechanisms for pain in fish fails, and that evidence and the precautionary principle support the possibility of conscious pain in fish. |
Abstract
Do fish consciously feel pain? Addressing this question, Key (2016) asks whether the neural mechanisms underlying conscious pain reports in humans can be identified in fish. This strategy fails in three ways. First, non-mammalian consciousness — if it exists — may depend on different mechanisms. Second, accumulating neurophysiological and behavioural evidence, evolutionary considerations, and emerging Bayesian brain theories suggest that if fish can feel at all, they can feel pain. Finally, the qualitative nature of pain and suffering obliges us, via the precautionary principle, to accommodate the possibility of its existence where doubt remains.